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ABSTRACT
research indicates that anti-social actionCharmlnp- or refusing- to help another human being) maylead to subsequent compensatory or reparative action,ihe research also suggests that the source of the
psycholog4.cal stress which typically follows anti-socialbehavior may be a decrease in one’s opinion of himself
C self-concept ) . The individual is then prone to engagein pro-social behavior (helping or refusing to injure
another human being) which raises the self-concept back
to its chronic level.
An analysis of the rewards and costs which determine
an Individual’s chronic self-concept level suggests the
possibility that each individual functions at an optimal
s^lf'”Concept level at which his outcome (rev;ards minus
costs) is at a maximuri. The individual strives to main-
tain this chronic self-concept level thus maximizing his
outcomes. Such a homeostatic mechanism has an important
i implication . If the self-concept is shifted, the indivi-
dual may be predisposed to engage in behavior which will
restore the self-concept to its chronic level.
The present research investigated the relationship
betv/een the benevolence dimension of the self-concept
and pro-social and anti-social behavior. In line with
the hypothesized homieostatic mechanism, the following
hypotheses were tested:
1. Pro-social action which results in a positive
displacement along the benevolence dimension of
the self-concept predisposes an Individual to
engage in anti-social behavior which has the
aim. of lowering the self-concept to its chronic
level
.
2. Anti-social action which results in a negative
displacement along the benevolence dimension of
the self-concept predisposes an individual to
engage in pro-social action whichlr\as the aim
of raising the self-concept to its chronic level.
One third (60) of the subjects helped a crippled
female student (a hired actr-ess) carry a stack of books
down a flight of stairs and out to a parking lot (pro-
social manipulation). Another third of the subjects
were prevented by the experimenter from complying with
the actress’ request (anti-social manipulation). The final
bird wore not exposed to any self-concept manipulation(controls). Following this manipulation, the subjects
were afforded an opportunity to administer either shock(anti-social dependent variable), money (pro-socialdependent variable), or lifht (neutral dependent
variable) to a (fictitious) experimenter's assistant.
A self-concept test was then administered.
Hypothesis 1 was supported. The pro-social nanipu-
lation resulted in a rise of the self-concept level which
led to anti-social action in the form of the adminis-
tration of shock. This anti-social activity restored the
self—concept to its chronic level. The pro— social manip-
ulation had no sipnlficant effect on subsequent pro-social
behavior.
Support was also found for Hypothesis 2. The anti-
social manipulation resulted in a lowering of the self-
concept level which increased the propensity to engage
in pro-social action which took the form of the
administration of reward. As predicted, the reward-
giving behavior raised the self-concept back to the
chronic level. The anti-social manipulation had no
significant effect on subsequent anti-social behavior.
The i iTplications of the findings were discussed
along with suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
There exists in American society a norm of bene-
volence: a culturally shared standard of conduct which
dictates that an individual should be ready and willing
to help a fellow man in need, and also refrain from
committing acts injurious to his fellow man. The present
research is concerned with behaviors v;hich represent
deviations from, or adherence to, the benevolence norm.
Deviations from; the norm will be termed anti-social
behavior, while behaviors which represent adherence to
the benevolence norm will be labelled pro-soc ial .
An analysis of what theorists and researchers have
identified as the advantages (rewards) and the disadvan-
tages (costs) of engaging in anti-social activity leads
to the expectation that m.an should be highly prone to
adhere to the benevolence norm.. However, mass media,
everyday observation, and em.pirical evidence all indicate
that the benevolence norm is often violated. One way to
account for a prevalence of anti-social behavior would
be to identify a potent, latent reward for engaging in
such behavior, or to identify a latent cost of
2en^g^ing in pro-social behavior.
A latent reward for engaging in anti-social behavior
can be deduced from a review of research concerned with
the alleviation of post-aggression psychological stress.
The research suggests that anti-social behavior generally
results in a loss of self-esteem and that justification
and compensation, the two most common responses of a
harm-doer to his deed, m.ay both operate in the service
of the maintenance of self-esteem. An aggressive action
lowers the self-concept , i . e
. ,
there is a decrease in
feelings of self-worth and self-respect, and the justi-
fication or corrpensation raises the self-concept back to
its normal level. If one assumes that an individual
strives to maintain this normal self-concept level, a
rise in the self-concept may lead to anti-social action
v/hich has the aim of restoring the self-concept to its
normal level just as a lowering of the self-concept
leads to compensatory action which raises the self-
concept to its normal level. The restoration of an
elevated self-concept back to its normal level may con-
stutute a potent, latent reward for engaging in anti-
social action.
Inadequacy of Current Theory
Because aggression may constitute a prevalent mode
3of anti-social activity, perhaps sorre theory of ap-fressive
behavior will suffice to explain the dynamics of anti-
social behavior. Aggression is typically defined as the
/
deliverance of a noxious stimulus and therefore theories
of aggression direct themselves to instances in v;hich
one person delivers a noxious stimulus to another person.
Violations of the benevolence norm however, need not
involve the deliverance of a noxious stimulus. Failing
to help another human being who is in dire need is a
violatjon of the benevolence norm, and is therefore defined
as anti-social but cannot be accurately labelled "aggres-
sive" since no noxious stimulus is delivered. Thus, much
anti-social activity cannot be accounted for in terms of
theories of aggression simply because such theories are
restricted by their definition of aggressive behavior.
Another shortcomilng of theories of aggression is
that they address themselves only to aggression which is
preceded by frustration and hence they do not attempt to
account for instrumiental aggression, "behavior primarily
oriented toward the attainment of some goal other than
doing injury (Berkowltz, 19^2, p.31)»" Many anti-social
acts are not preceded by frustration and are not primarily
directed toward doing injury. Berkowltz cites several
examples of instrum.ental aggression which, according to
the present analysis, are also instances of anti-social
4action: killing a military enemy in an effort to win a
war; spreading vicious lies about a political rival in
an effort to win an election. Theories of aggression do
not address themselves to such phenomena. It is the
prevalence and significance of such anti-social phenomena
coupled with the lack of research and theory to account
adequately for such phenomena which has provided the
impetus for the present research.
Identifying the Rev;ards and Costs
of Anti-Social. Behavior
The model presented in this paper is derived from a
reward-cost natrix associated with every situation in
which an individual must decide whether to engage in som.e
form of anti-social behavior. The decision is based upon
a comparison of the anticipated rewards and costs asso-
ciated with each of the two alternatives. The chosen
alternative will be that one which results in the highest
outcome, i.e., the one in which the anticipated rewards
minus the anticipated costs is greatest. This approach,
in its utilization of a reward-cost matrix, is very
similar to the "exchange theory" approach of Thibaut and
Kelley (1959). The principal difference is that exchange
theory is primarily concerned with the formation and
maintenance of interpersonal relationships while the
present approach utilizes the reward-cost matrix to
analyze the decision-makinp process involved in anti-
social and pro-social action.
5
The anticipated rewards associated with the decision
to enpage in anti-social action depend upon the situation
in question. For example, the reward for eng;aplnp in
military com.bat nay be the preservation of one’s ovm life
or victory for one's allies. Engaging in race riots nay
lead to social betterment. Stealing may result in an
increase in material gains. Spreading lies may lead to
victory in an election. There are instances however, in
v/hich individuals choose not to take part in anti-social
activity. There are draftees who refuse to kill, Negroes
who abstain from race riots, people who v/ould not steal
if they v/ere on the brink of starvation. Such instances
of abstinence suggest that, under some conditions, the
anticipated costs associated v/ith the decision to engage
in anti-social behavior are high relative to the antici-
pated rewards. Such anticipated costs, vfhich tend to
inhibit anti-social behavior, include physical punishment
(Seward, 19^*6; VJhiting and Child, 1953), interference
with the attainment of some goal (Zander, 1958), and
verbal reprimand from an authority figure (Cohen, 1955).
A potent additional cost of engaging in anti-social action
is cited by Berkowitz (1962). "The strength of an indi-
tendencies is directly associatedvidual's aggressive
6with the intensity of the arrression anxiety subsequently
aroused in him to the extent that he anticipates punish-
ment or disapproval for app-ression If the individual
is instipated to action that ho knows is a serious depar-
ture from his behavioral standards, faiilt would be antici-
pated and this could prevent the action from occurrinp
(p*93)." Further, it seems reasonable to assume that
this anticipated cost (psycholopical discom.fort) will
vary directly with the mapnitude of harm to the potential
victim since the perpetrator should penerally expect preat
psycholopical discomfort followinp severe harm.-doinp and
only minor puilt followinp acts which result In relatively
little harm.
An e jq-icrlm-ental situation in which inaction constututes
anti -social behavior can be used to illustrate the reward-
cost matrix. In a study by Lerner and Sim.mons ( 1966),
subjects observed a peer who was part icipatinp in a verbal
learninp e jq'ieri rent . Pivery time the peer responded
incorrectly, she received what appeared to be a very
painful electric shock (actually, no shock was adminis-
tered). All subjects viewed this performance for a 10-
minute period. Accordinp to the present author, anti-
social behavior consists of passive observation by a
subject while pro-social behavior consists of objection
to the procedure on behalf of the learner. The reward-
7cost matrix associated with the two possible alternative
behaviors in the above situation is illustrated in Figure 1
Similar matrices can be projected for all situations in
which an individual must decide whether to enp-ape in some
mode of anti-social behavior.
REWARD COST
ANTI-
SOCIAL
PRO-
SOCIAL
^
1
Avoidance of potential
censure by an author-
ity fipure. Guarantee
of experimental credit
or m.oney.
Psychological discomfort
associated with pas-
sively watchinp someone
undergo extreme pain.
Avoidance of psycholo-
gical discomfort asso-
ciated v/lth passively
v/atchinp someone
undergo extreme pain.
Possible positive
feeling- of humaneness.
Potential censure by an
authority figure. Poten-
tial loss of experimen-
tal credit or money.
Fip.l. The reward-cost matrix associated
with a decision of whethier to enp'ag'e in
anti-social or pro-social behavior.
8Predicting from the Reward-Cost Matrix
Two experimental studies will be cited in order to
see whether the predictions generated from the reward-
cost matrix are borne out. Of the rewards and costs thus
far cited, those relevant to each experimental study will
be considered. In a study by Milgram (1963), subjects,
playing the role of teacher, were told by the experimenter
to administer electric shock to another subject (the
learner) each tine the learner responded with an incorrect
answer. For each incorrect answer, the teacher was
instructed to raise the intensity of shock. No shock was
actually given as the learner v;as an experimental stooge.
As the procedure pro gressed ’ and the shock level increased,
the teacher received feedback fromi the learner which
indicated that the learner was undergoing excruciating
pain. The teacher’s cost (psychological disco nfort ) of
continuing to shock the learner was extremely high.
Indeed, Milgram reports th.at subjects broke out into a
cold sweat, laughed uncontrollably
,
and dug their nails
into their skin. The cost of engaging in pro-social
behavior (refusing to continue administering the shocks)
was possible censure by the experimenter for not obeying
his orders and possibly ruining the e>periment. The
0xtj’0ifi0ly hJ gh cost of continuing the anti—social activity
corrpared to what appears to the lesser cost of ceasing
9the anti-social activity leads to the prediction that
many of the subjects would have refused to continue
administering the shocks. This prediction is not borne
out. Although some subjects refused to continue, the
najority of subjects continued administering the shock
until the final shock lever had been pulled.
The finding that the majority of subjects do continue
administering the shock might indicate that the cost of
pro-social action in this experimental situation is more
than sufficient to offset the cost of anti-social action.
Yet, it is difficult to accept such an explanation v;hen
one realizes that conplying with the experimenter’s
requests results in such severe, if not lethal, doses of
shock to the learner.
A similar situation in which subjects were asked to
cause harm to another human being can be found in a study
by Glass (196^1). In this study, subjects who were on
record as being either somewhat opposed or extremely
opposed to the use of electric shock on humans for scien-
tific purposes were given the option of whether or not
to take part in an experiment in which they would be
required to administer shock to another subject;
The anticipated high cost (psychological discomfort)
of taking part in an activity which is contrary to one’s
stated behavior standards, coupled with what would appear
10
to be a snail cost (based upon the elaborate option) of
refuoing to administer the shock, leads to the prediction
that many of the subjects would sinply take their leave
and avoid the distasteful activity. Of the 62 subjects
given the shock option, 60 chose to remain and administer
the shock. Glass does not attempt to interpret this
surprising finding as the research was prinarily directed
toward the investigation of post-aggression dissonance
reduction
.
Ihe findings fromi the experiments cited above,
together with the high frequency of anti-social behavior
encountered in everyday living, might lead one to believe
thao causing harm, to another human being does not result
xn any psychological discomifort to the harm-doer and
hence, thei’e is little or no deterrent to causing harmi.
Studies by Milgram (I963), Glass ( 1964 ), Lerner and
Sim.mons (I966). and Darlington and Macker (I966), have
shown that harmi-doing does, in fact, result in psycho-
logical stress to the harn-doer. As noted earlier, in
som;e cases this stress is so severe that the harm.-doer
might dig his nails into his skin, break into a cold sv/eat,
or even convulse. The fact that people are so willing
to risk the possibility of such unpleasant aftereffects
of anti-social behavior suggests that either there is some
higji cost of pro-social behavior or some high reward
11
value of anti-social behavior which has not been taken
into account in the reward-cost matrix. Further, this
as yet unspecified reward or cost coupled with the other
rewards and costs inherent in the situation must, in the
majority of instances, outweigh the psychological discom-
fort following the anti-social act in order for it to
account for man’s propensity to engage in such behavior.
Anti-Social Behavior and the Self-Concept
In an article concerned with the motivational fac-
tors involved in the resolution of decisional conflicts,
Janls (1959) asserts that acts v;hich are violations of
one’s moral code are typically followed by a loss of
self-esteem. Empirical support for this assertion is
provided by a series of studies by Pepitone ( 1964 ).
After causing harm to other individuals by being overly
punitive, subjects filled out an extensive series of
questionnaires tapping such variables as rationalization,
self-criticism, self-justification
,
self-equivocation,
etc. Based upon analyses of these data, Pepitone con-
cluded that justification and compensation, the two most
comm.on responses elicited by the subjects, may both
operate in the service of the maintenance of self-esteem.
The results of several other experiments are compa-
tible with the assertion that a lowering of the self-
12
concept is the primary source of psychological stress
following anti-social behavior. Davis and Jones (i960),
Buss ( 1961 ), Berkowltz (1962), and Glass (196H) all found
that subjects, after causing harm to another human being,
tended to reject and devalue their victim. Lerner and
Simmons (1966) found the same effect when subjects merely
observed another subject receiving shook from an experi-
menter. Lerner and Simmons interpret their results in
light of a "Just world hypothesis" which states that
people need to believe in a Just world. An Implication
of this hypothesis is that when someone receives unjusti-
fied pain, subjects reject and devalue him because it is
Justifiable to cause pain to an inferior beirif^.
Although the "Just world hypothesis" niay be valid,
there is an alternative interpretation of the Lerner and
Simmons results. By rejecting and devaluing the victim,
one not only rakes the victim inferior, but also makes
himself relatively superior. Because subjects were not
asked to rate non-victims following the anti-social act,
there is no way to determine whether the objective of the
denigration response was solely to make the victim inferior
or whether the denigration response was utilized to make
the harm-*doer relatively superior. Self-enhancement need
not be accomplished through a denigration process; however,
this mode nay have been made most salient by the
13
experimental procedure which javo subjects the opportunity
to evaluate their victims immediately following the anti-
social act.
A study by Darlington and Macker (1966) illustrates a
behavioral response to one’s own aggressive behavior. In
this study, subjects in an experimental group were led to
believe that they had caused harm to another human being.
Control subjects were given no such belief. Analysis of
subsequent behavior revealed that the experimental subjects
were significantly more willing to donate blood to a local
hospital than were the control subjects. If the experimen-
tal subjects in this study felt less worthy following their
anti-social behavior, the blood-donating act would tend to
relieve their psychological discomfort by raising their self-
concepts. Similarly, the subjects in the Lerner and Simmons
(1966) study may have been exhibiting a similar response;
the subjects enhanced their self-worth by denigpfating
their victims.
There are several studies (for example, Berscheid
and Walster, I967) that show that harm-doers will attempt
to compensate their victims if an opportunity for compen-
sation exists. It is possible to view such compensatory
behavior as an attempt on the part of the harm-doer to
repair a damaged self-concept by reaffirming his own
worthiness. The anti-social act lowers the self-concept
and the compensatory or reparative act raises the self
concept back to its normal level.
1^1
The Nature of the Self-Concept
A typical definition of "self-concept" is provided
by Rogers (1951): "The self-concept or self-structure
may be thought of as an organized configuration of percep-
tions of the self which are admissible to awareness. It
is coirposed of such elements as the perceptions of one’s
characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts
of the self in relation to others and to the environm.ent
;
the value qualities which are perceived as associated with
experiences and objects; and goals and ideals which
are percieved as having positive or negative valence
(p. 136)."
As this definition suggests, the self-concept is
conposed of one’s perceptions of many different charac-
teristics of himself. Som.e of these characteristics are
evaluative in that the individual judges himself in
relation to some affectively-laden characteristic, e.g.,
"I am very honest and a person should be this honest,"
"I am not very intelligent and one should be very intel-
ligent." Other characteristics may not have any evaluations
attached to them, e.g., "I have black hair, I have blue
.eyes." It is important to note that there are two
15
judgements involved when one considers characteristics
which are subject to self-evaluation. First, the
individual judges his position (level) along the relevant
dimension, e.g.
,
"I am fairly intelligent, I ami vei’y
honest. Second, he judges the value of the characteristic,
e.g. ."It is very good to be intelligent, it is not important
to be honest." The present research is concerned with the
benevolence dimension of the self-concept and two assump-
tions regarding benevolence are made. First, since bene-
volence represents adherence to a norm, the assunption is
made that people view benevolence as a positive or desirable
trait. Second, individual differences in the importance
of this dimension are randomly distributed among any given
population
.
According to the present analysis, the chronic level
of the self-concept is governed by reward-cost matrices
along the various dimensions. Adhering to the maximum
outcome concept cited earlier, the chronic level of an
individual’s self-concept is that point at which his
outcome (the rewards associated with that level of the
self-concept ninus the costs he must incur to maintain
that sel f-coiicept level) is at a maximum.
Rewards and costs relevant to the benevolence dimen-
sion of the self-concept are illustrated in the following
example. Consider an individual who desires to maintain
16
a hi£iily positive self-concept along the benevolence
dirnension. Such an individual must engage in benevolent
activity which would undoubtedly require a sacrifice of
time and/or money. He must also refrain from comritting
acts which society might lable "malevolent." These are
specific costs which one nust incur if he wishes to think
of himself as highly benevolent. The rewards associated
with the self-concept of high benevolence are the gratl-
fying feelings of self-worth and self-respect, and the
praise, respect, and gratitude of other people.
Individual differences in the weighting of relevant
rewards and costs account for individual differences in
chronic self-concept levels. Such differences in weight-
ing are a function of the actual behavior of the individual
and his evaluation of his behavior. The actual behavior
of the individual is governed both by intrinsic and
extrinsic factors. Intrinsic factors include an individ-
ual's self-concept along dimensions other than the one
in question and_, his evaluation of the relevant dimension.
Extrinsic factors include income, vocation, physique, etc.
The benevolence dimension of the self-concept may
be affected by other dimensions of the self-concept in
that a low self-concept along such dimensions as intelli-
gence or competence tends to inhibit benevolent activity
by making benevolent activity extremely costly. For
17
exarrple, one nay hesitate to volunteer for hospital work
because he feels he is not intelligent enouj-h to Interact
effectively with the patients. Similarly, one may refuse
to Join the volunteer fire department because he thinks
he would prove incompetent. For this individual, the
cost of engaging in benevolent activity would be prohibi-
tive and hence, he chooses to maintain a relatively low
level of benevolence which represents his maximum outcome
level
.
Generally
,
the more an individual values a dimension
of the self-concept, the more motivated he will be to
maintain a high level of that dimension. Consider an
individual who places an extremely high value on knowledge.
In order to maintain a high level of knowledge, he spends
five hours every day reading books. Although five hours
per day may seem like a great expenditure of time, it is
more than compensated for by the rewards the individual
experiences as a i*esult of his knowledge. These rewards
Include feelings of self-worth and self-respect as well
as the praise and respect of other people. An individual
who did not place a high value on knowledge would nob be
expected to incur the cost of reading time since the
rewards he would experience because of his knowledge
would be negligible. He would not be expected to experi-
ence feelings of self-worth or self-respect since he
18
attaches little value to knowledge.
Extrinsic factors which iray regulate an Individual's
benevolent activity do so by determining how costly a
particular sacrifice will be. People in low income
brackets may not be able to afford to donate any money
to charity and this may result in a relatively low self-
concept of benevolence. A similar situation exists for
the man who works sixteen hours a day and therefore
cannot become a Boy Scout leader, or the ninety pound
weakling who is unable to donate blood.
Different people evaluate identical behaviors in
different ways. Such differences in evaluations can affect
the self-concept in that the individual may or may not
consider a given act to be relevant to the dimension in
question. Consider a volunteer hospital worker who per-
ceives his volunteer work as highly humanistic, highly
self-sacrificial, and generally, above and beyond the
cal], of duty. This percept enhances feelings of self-
worth which, according to the present analysis, is
rewarding. It is also possible that an individual views
his volunteer work simply as a fulfillment of one's obli-
gation to society. Such a percept is not likely to lead
to an enhancement of one's feelings about his worthiness.
The volunteer work is therefore not acconpanied by hifii
reward value and hence the self-concept of this individual
19
is not hi(jily positive even though he engages in altruistic
activity
.
It is possible to shift the self-concept level by
nanipulating relevant rewards. For exanple, one r'ay be
so dissatisfied with his self-concept that he undergoes
therapy in an effort to raise it. Consider the volunteer
hospital w'orker who views his work as sirrply paying a
debt to society. He is incurring costs in the form of
the time and the effort he expends at his job yet his
rewards are negligible because there is little or no
gratifying feeling which acconpanies his work. After
undergoing therapy, he viev\rs his volunteer hospital work
as higjily humanistic and altruistic. He now experiences
a gi'atifying feeling from his work and thus, his rewards
are increased. His outcome (rewards minus costs) is also
Increased and his self-concept along the benevolence
dimension rises to a new level. It is inportant to note
that both before and after therapy, his self-concept was
at that point where his outcome was at a maximum based
upon his current perceptions of his behavior. What has
changed is his evaluation of his altruistic behavior, the
new evaluation increasing the reward value of the behavior.
Changes in cost components, e.g. an increase or
decrease in income or leisure time, would also be expected
to result in a shift of the self-concept level. If costs
20
decrease, an upward shift would occur. An increase in
costs would result in a downward shift of the self-concept.
Assuming there is no change in rewards or costs,
there is a strong tendency to maintain one's chronic self-
concept level and thus maximize outcomes. There are,
however, pressures which invariably result in shifts from
this level. Susceptibility to such pressures appears to
be a function of the chronic level of the self-concept,
the direction of the pressure toward change, and the
magnitude of the advocated change (Eagly, 1967). The
experiments cited earlier (Lerner and Simmons, 19^6;
Darlington and Macker, I966) lend support to the asser-
tion that lowering the self-concept instigates the indi-
vidual to take cognitive or behavioral action which will
raise the self-concept back to the maximum outcome level.
Such a restoration of the self-concept would be predicted
from the present maximum outcome viewpoint since, according
to the present analysis, the decrease in rewards associ-
ated with the lowering of the self-concept necessarily
outweighs the concomitant decrease in cost. The present
study examines the behavioral effects of displacing the
benevolence dimension of the self-concept from Its
maximum outcone level.
A rise in the self-concept results in added rewards
for the individual in the form of praise and respect.
21
and a general enhancement of one's self worth. Along
with these rewards however, there is a rise in costs such
as time, effort and money, which would have to be expended
if one wished to maintain this elevated self-concept.
Because the individual was functioning at the maximum
outcome point prior to the rise in the self-concept, the
added costs at the new level may outweigh the added
rewards. Just as this imbalance created a pressure to
restore a lowered self-concept to its chronic level, it
will also create a pressure to restore an elevated self-
concept to its chronic level. In the case of the lowered
so If-concept
,
some anti-social behavior results in the
lowering and some pro-social behavior accomplishes the
lestoration. Since the dimension in Question is bene-
volence
,
it follows that pro-social behavior can raise
the self-concept and anti-social behavior may restore the
self-concept to its maximum outcome level.
The Acquisition of Pro-Social
and Anti-Social Modes
If, in fact, there exists a, tendency to maintain a
chronic self-concept level, the possible source of such
a tendency may be traced back to child rearing practices.
The parents serve as the primary source of rewards and
costs since it is they upon whom the child relies to
define his self-v\'orth . When the child engages in "bad"
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behavior, the parents' reaction typically consists of
such censorious comments as "You've been a bad boy."
"You ought to be ashamed of yourself," etc.; As a
consequence, the child’s opinion of himself is lowered.
At the same time, however, the parents might suggest
actions by which the child nay redeem himself
.
Apologize to your sister," "Help Daddy mow the lawn,"
are pro-social actions suggested by the parents as means
of compensating for the initial "bad" behavior. These
compensatory behaviors may result in a restoration of the
child's lov/ered self-concept throughi parental comments
such as "You're really a good boy," or "All is forgiven
because you helped your Daddy," etc.
The process by which a child acquires antl-socjal
nodes may be based upon the manner in v^rhich the parents
expect the child to behave and their punitive reactions
to his behavior. The child learns that particualar "bad"
behaviors will result in punishnent of particular severi-
ties. Simillarly, he learns that he will receive certain
rewards from his parents for being "good." If he attenpts
to raise his self-concept by bdng "good", thereby receiving
praise from his parents, the parents might eventually
learn to expect this "good" behavior as standard.
Although, the child miglit still be rewarded for this "good"
behavior, it is possible that these rewards decrease as
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the novelty of this behavior decreases. It is also
possible that behaviors which were formerly construed as
only slipiitly "bad" are now viewed as serious departures
from expected behavior. This would result in the child’s
being punished severely for acts which formerly only
warranted a minor scolding. Although some absolute
standard of behavior may remain in effect, relative
standards may affect the rewards and costs associated
with specific behaviors. The child learns that the added
costs incurred by raising the self-concept outweigh the
added rewards. If the child engages in behavior which
he feels will raise his parents’ expectancies, he learns
that he can counter this possibility by engaging in sone
anti-social activity that thereby returns the parents’
e jqDectancies to a reasonable level.
A Hom^eostatic Model of Anti-Social Behavior
The major assertion of the homeostatic model is as
follows: A positive displacement along the benevolence
dimension of the self-concept predisposes an individual
to engage in anti-social behavior by which equilibrium, of
the self-concept my be restored. Conversely, displace-
ment in the negative direction will Instigate the indi-
vidual to pro-social action. Providing an individual
with credible information which is discrepant from his
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chronic self-concept is a cognitive means of inducing
dlsequllibriun. Since the Individual strives to maintain
equilibrium, external pressure, e.g. reward or threat is
necessary to either raise or lower the self-concept
from its maximum outcome level. Although the self-
concept is, in general, an enduring structure, it is
argued that only minor pressure is required to create
temporary disequilibrium. One reason that greater pressure
is unnecessary is that the individual has learned efficient
means to restore euilibrium.
An example of disequilibrium in the negative direction
resulting from forced-conpliance is the instance in which
the experimenter requests the subject to administer shock
to another person. Contributing to charity solely because
the donation was solicited by an employer represents
forced-corrpliance behavior which results in a rise in the
level of the benevolence dimension of the self-concept.
There are numerous pro-social acts which one is
pressured into committing. The source of the pressure
can be a desire to avoid embarrassment, a desire to earn
money, a desire to please an authoritarian figure, etc.
Such pro-social gestures include holding doors for other
people, giving up one’s seat on a crowded bus, driving
courteously, contributing to charity, etc. These fre-
quently encountered pro-social acts and their concomitant
2b
positive displaceinent of the level of the benevolence
dinension of the self-concept are hypothesized to account
for man’s propensity to engage in anti-social actions.
It is important to note that according to the present
analysis, if these pro-social acts occur in the absence
of any pressure, e
.
g. donating to charity even when no one
has requested a donation, then either these acts
represent an attempt to restore to equilibrium a nega-
tively displaced self-concept or, they represent normal
activity for that individual's chronic self-concept level.
In terms of the present analysis, the higii degree of
anti-social behavior that has often been observed among
subjects in laboratory settings would be explained
according to two processes. Disequilibrium in a positive
direction is created when the individual is induced into
serving as a subject. He sees himself as expending time
and effort for the sake of scientific research and this
perception leads to an elevation of the self-concept.
This phenomenon alone would lead to a prediction of high
intensity anti-social activity in the service of lowering
the self-concept to its chronic level. The subject is
then asked to inflict harm upon another human being.
Even though the subject night experience conflict between
harming another human being and refusing to obey the
experimenter, the fact that he has learned efficient
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reparative modes results in his con^^lyinp readily with
the experinenter’s request. This readiness to conply
with an anti-social request coupled with the fact that
the subject is striving to restore equilibrium results
in anti-social activity of such high intensity that pre-
dictions of trained psychiatrists grossly underestimated
the m.agnitude of anti-social behavior v/hich the subjects
exhibited in such a situation (Milgram, I963 ). The present
miodel however, predicts sUch high intensity anti-social
behavior based upon the interaction between effective
pressure due to efficient restoration modes and the
effects of disequilibrium of the benevolence dimension
of the self-concept in the positive direction.
Empirical support for a phenomenon v;hich is closely
related to the hypothesized homeostatic model is provided
by Aronson and Carls mith (1962). These authors assert
that psychological inconsistency (dissonance) "exists
between a cognition about the self (i.e., a self-relevant
performance e^^ectancy) and a cognition about behavior
which in inconsistent with this expectancy (p.l? 8 )."
Aronson and Carls mith hypothesized that if a subject is
given an expectancy that he will perform, poorly on a task
and is then told that his performance was, in fact, very
gpod, he will experience dissonance. If the subject is
then given an opportunity to perform the task again, his
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latter performance will be inferior to his initial per-
formance so that his behavior will be consistent with
his e^^ectancy. This hypothesis was confirmed and
replications of the study generally support the hypothe-
sized phenomenon (e.g., Brock, Edelman, Edwards, and
Schuck, 1965).
The task the subjects were given in the above experi-
ment was novel (diagnosing schizophrenia from photographs)
so it seem.s reasonable to assure that the subjects had
1^0 preconceived notions of how v/ell they should performi
on such a task. Subjects received feedback about their
performance on a preliminary phase of the task and this
feedback provided them with a performance expectancy for
a later phase of the task. This performance expectancy
is analogous to the chronic level of the benevolence
dimension of the self-concept relevant to the present
research. Both performance expectancy and chronic self-
concept level inply a pognition of the self; a psycholo-
gical standard from v;hich behavior should not deviate
if one is to miaintain consistency. Aronson and Carls mlth
showed that subjects strive to behave in a manner which
is consistent with a performance expectancy. The present
research attempts to show that behavior will be consistent
with the chronic level of the self-concept.
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Hypotheses
1. If an Individual is pressured into engaging in
a pro-social action that results in a rise in the level
of the benevolence dimension of the self-concept, he is
then predisposed to engage in anti-social behavior that
restores the self-concept to its chronic level.
2. If an individual is pressured into engaging in
an anti-social action that results in a lowering of the
level of the benevolence dimension of the self-concept,
he is then predisposed to engage in pro-social behavior
that restores the self-concept to its chronic level.
Purpose
CHAPTER II
PRETEST
The purpose of the pretest was to determine whether
the experimental manipulations would effectively displace
the self-concept level in a positive and a negative
direction. It was also necessary to determine whether
the instrum.ent used to measure the self-concept was
sufficiently sensitive to changes in the self-concept
level
.
Subjec ts
All 60 pr.etest subjects were male students, enrolled
in an introductory psychology course at the University
of Massachusetts. Students enrolled in this course v/ere
required to participate in 3 experiments during the course
of the semester. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned
to each of the 3 experimental conditions.
E xperimental Manipulations
An undergraduate female form, the Drama Department
at the University of Massachusetts was hired to carry
out the experimental manipulations. She will be referred
to as the actress.
Positive displacement ( D+ ) group : When a subject
arrived at the laboratory, he found a chair outside the
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laboratory. A sign on the laboratory door read: ’'Subjects
For Experlrnent 68-41 Please Wait Here." The subject
generally sat down to wait. After approxi nately 30
seconds, the actress, limping as thougii she were afflicted
with some birth defect, came out of a nearby office,
approached the subject, and in a meek, stuttering voice
asked him if he would please assist her in carrying some
books down a flight of steps and out to her car in a nearby
parking lot. All subjects coirplied with the request.
The subject was then thanked profusely by the actress and
returned to the chair outside the laboratory. The experi-
nenter, who had been inside the laboratory, opened the
laboratory door and asked the subject to come inside.
Negative displacement (D-) group : After the subject
v;as seated outside the laboratory, the e )q)eri menter
,
who
was inside the laboratory, opened the door and asked the
subject if he v/as a subject for experiment 68-41. After
the subject said "yes," the experimenter stated the fol-
lowing: "I'll be ready for you in a few seconds. Please
wait right here as we must begin the experiment in Just
a few moments." The experimenter then closed the door
to the laboratory. At this point, as in the D+ condition,
the actress came limping out of the nearby office and
asked for the subject’s assistance in carrying her books.
Since the experimenter had Just asked the subject to wait.
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the subject refused to assist the actress in every instance,
generally explaining, that he could not leave because of
his participation in an experiirent. Looking disappointed,
the actress returned to her office, gathered the stack
of books and as she linped out of her office, in clear
view of the subject, dropped the stack of books on the
corridor floor. Precisely at this moment, the experinenter
opened the laboratory door and asked the subject to cone
inside
.
Control (C) group : Subjects in this gi’’oup iierely
sat outside of the laboratory for approximately 3 minutes
before the experimenter asked them to enter.
Self-Concept Test
Upon entering the laboratory, the subject v/as seated
at a desk and was asked to fill out the self-concept test.
In all conditions, the subject was told that the Psychology
Department had requested all experimenters to administer
this questionnaire to all their subjects so that the
department could assess some basic traits of their subject
population. This rationale was given so that subjects
would not associate the self-concept test with the experi-
mental manipulations.
The self-concept test consisted of an Instruction
sheet followed by 25 adjectives on which the subject was
to describe himself. Each adjective was represented by
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a 9-polnt scale which ranped from extreiiely below average
to extremely above average (see appendix for the instruc-
tion sheet and a list of the ad.^ect ives ) . Three relevant
adjectives were interspersed within the 22 Irrelevant ones.
The relevant adjectives were: flG- Kind; ;5'l^l- Merciful;
i5'20- Selfish. After the subject had filled out the
self-concept test, he was thoroughly debriefed and asked
not to speak to anyone about the experiment.
Results
In order to use the sum of the subject’s three scoi*es
("kind," "merciful," and "selfish") as the self-concept
dependent variable, it was necessary to show that these
three adjectives v/ere significantly interrelated. Inter-
correlations amiong the three adjectives were calculated
without regard to experimental group, i.e. all 60 "kind"
ratings were conpared with all 60 "merciful" ratings, etc.
Significant correlations were obtained for the three
possible pairs of relevant adjectives. For "kind" and
"merciful," r = . 661
, ^ = 58, £<^.01, for "kind" and
"selfish," r = -.25^*, ^ = 58, £<.05 and for "nerciful"
and "selfish," r = -.265, ^ = 58, £<T.05. These signifi-
cant correlations supported the assumption that all three
adjectives were indicators of benevolence and hence, the
sum of the subject's three scores constituted the
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self-concept dependent variable.
A one-way analysis of variance on the self-concept
dependent variable (the suit of the "kind," "merciful,"
and reversed "selfish" scores) yielded a sipnificant
overall difference between the three pretest groups
(P - 18.76, ^ = 2/57, £< .01). Dunnett’s tests (Myers,
1966) were enployed to compare the control group to each
of the experimental groups. The mean self-concept score
for subjects in the control group was I7.IO (out of a
possible 27 Indicating maxirnum benevolence)
. The mean
score for subjects in the positive displacement group was
19.50. This difference, 2 .^ 0
,
was found to be significant
(d - 3.30, ^ = 3 / 57 , £ i’he mean self-concept
score for subjects in the neg’ative displacenent group
was 15.05. Comparing this mean to that of the control
gir’oup
,
the difference, 2 . 05
,
also was significant
(d = 2 . 82
,
_df = 3/57
, P <. 05 ) .
Conclusions
Based upon the significant differences in self-
concept scores between subjects in the control group and
each of the experimental groups, it was concluded that
the experimental manipulations were effective in displac-
ing the self-concept in the appropriate directions and,
the self-concept test was sufficiently sensitive to
measure these displacements.
CHAPTER III
METHOD
Sub.i’ects
All 180 subjects were male students enrolled in the
summer session of the same introductory pyschology course
in which the pretest subjects w’ere enrolled. Twenty
subjects were randomly assigned to each of 9 experimental
groups
.
Experimenta l Design
A 3 x 3 conpletely randomized factorial design was
enployed. The first factor represents the experimental
nanipulation (described in the pretest chapter) of the
^^“*^oncept
. Subjects in the positive displacement (D+)
group were pressured into committing the pro-social act
prior to their entering the laboratory. According to
the hypotheses, the rise in the subject’s self-concept
level which results from this pro-social act causes him
to be predisposed to engage in anti-social behavior in
order to restore equilibrium to his self-concept. Subjects
in the negative displacement (D-) group were pressured
into committing an anti-social act prior to their entering
the laboratory. This action results in a lowering of the
self-concept level and hence, subjects in this group
should be predisposed to engage in pro-social action in
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an effort to raise the self-concept back to its rraxirmrn
outcome level. Subjects in the control (C) group were
not pressured into performing any action prior to their
entering the laboratory. These subjects served as a base-
line against which the self-concepts and dependent
variable of subjects in the D+ and D- groups could be
compared
.
Within each of these groups viere 3 additional groups.
Following the experimental manipulation, one third (20)
of the subjects in the D+
,
D-, and C groups were given
an opportunity to inflict harm upon another human being
and were then given the test to measure the self-concept.
Another third of the subjects were given an opportunity
to help another human being immediately following the
experimental manipulation and were then given the self-
concept test. The final third of subjects in the D+
,
D-
,
and C groups engaged in neutral interaction with another
person following the experimental manipulation and were
then gi.ven the self-concept test. These subjects served
as controls for the possible effect of dyadic interaction
per se on the self-concept and also provided a baseline
for the dependent variable to which subjects in the
"harm" and "help" groups could be compared. The experi-
nental design, is shown in Figure 2 .
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Opportunity to,
inflict harm
^Opportunity to
—
help
Neutral
interaction
> Self-concept test
Opportunity to
inflict harm
^ Opportunity to
help
Neutra],
interaction
Self-concept test
No activity...
-^Opportunity to.
Inflict harm
'^Opportunity to—
help
Neutral
interaction
^Self-concept test
Fi p. 2. The experimental design.
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Apparatu s
The basic piece of apparatus was sirllar to that
described by Buss (I 96 I). It consisted of a subject’s
rnodule and a relay rack both of which were in the labora-
tory. These pieces of equipment were connected to an
experimenter’s nodule in an adjoining room. The subject’s
module consisted of 10 pull levers numbered 1 through 10
in a horizontal rov/ with a red light above each lever.
At the top of the module were 2 additional lights; a green
light labelled "left cue response" and an amber light
labelled "right cue response." The relay rack contained
a series of relays, wires, an interval tiner, and a buzzer.
When the subject depressed a lever, the buzzer rang for
1 second and the red light above that lever went on for 1
second
.
The experimenter’s m.odule in the adjoining room,
consisted of 2 levers which activated the left or right
cue response lights on the subject’s module. Ten lights
on the e xperimenter ’ s module indicated which lever the
subject had depressed.
Procedure
Subjects given the opportunity to inflict harm.
(H^^) group ) . Upon entering the laboratory, the subject
was seated in front of his module and was given the
following instructions. "This experiment is concerned
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with the effects of electric shock on cardiac deceleration
in humns. Electrodes will be attached to rry assistant
in the adjoining room and I will be in there recording
his physiological reactions to receiving shock. Your
Job will be the following: Every time the left cue
response llgjcit goes on, you are to do nothing. Every
time the rlglit cue response light goes on, you are to
press one of these shock levers. You may press any lever
you wish, but do not hold it down, merely press it and
release it inmediately. The higher the number of the
shock lever, the greater the intensity of shock which
the lever delivers. Lever Numher 1 delivers Just enough
current to cause a mild, tingling sensation. The current
delivered by lever Nuinber 5 causes very mild pain. The
shock from lever Number 10 results in extreme pain to
the recipient of the shock. I am going into the adjoin-
ing room to hook up the apparatus. In a few minutes,
one of the cue response lights will go on and the experi-
nent will have begun. Do you have any questions?''
The experimenter then went into the adjoining room
and after several minutes, during which he was supposedly
hooking up the physiological recording apparatus, he
turned on a tape recorder which played a pre“-recorded
conversation between the experimenter and another male.
This recorded conversation could be heard by the subject
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and was desipped to convince him that there was, in fact,
another person in the adjoining room who would actually
be receiving the shock. After the recording was over,
the experimenter sat in front of his module and began a
randomly pre-deteriTlned series of lever presses, 10 of
which lighted the subject's left cue response lighit and
10 of which lighted the right cue response light. The
dependent measure was the mean level shock administered
by the subject on the 10 "shock trials."
Following this part of the procedure, the experi-
menter returned to the subject's room to administer the
1 ap t test along with the rationale for adminis-
tering the test described in the pretest chapter. After
the subject had filled out the self-concept test, he was
asked to fill out an additional questionnaire which was
desipned to find out if he had employed some cognitive
means to restore equilibrium to the self-concept. The
questionnaire revealed how the subject evaluated his own
behavior in relation to the experimenter, in relation to
the experimenter's assistant, and how the subject per-
ceived the experimental procedure per se (see appendix
for a copy of the questionnaire).
Subjects given the opportunity to help ( HELP group )
.
The procedure for subjects in this group was the same as
the procedure for the subjects in the HARM proup . The
instructions given the subject were changed as follows:
"This experiment is concerned with the physiological
effects of receiving reward. Electrodes will be attached
to my assistant in the adjoining room and I will be in
there recording his physiological reactions to receiving
reward. Your job will be the following: Every time the
left cue response light goes on, you are to do nothing.
Evei y time the right cue response light goes on, you are
to press one of these reward levers. You may press any
lever you wish but, do not hold it down, merely press it
and release it immediately. The higher the number of
the reward lever, the greater the magnitude of reward
which the lever delivers. Each lever number represents
ten cents so tnat lever Number 1 delivers a dime, lever
Number 5 delivers fifty cents, and lever Number 10 delivers
a dollar. My assistant is permitted to keep the money
he receives. I am going into l^he adjoining room to hook
up the apparatus.. In a fev7 minutes, one of the cue response
li gilts will go on and the experiment will have begun. Do
you have any questions?"
Again, the experimenter went into the adjoining
roomi and played a taped conversation to convince the
subject that there was, in fact, another person in the
adjoining room who would be receiving the reward. The
dependent measure of pro-social behavior was the nean
level of reward administered by the subject on the 10
"reward trials." Again, there was a total of 20 trials.
The subject was then given the self-concept test and the
post-experimental questionnaire.
Neutr^ Interaction (NI) proup
. After being seated
in front of the module, subjects in this group were given
the following instructions: "This experiment is concerned
with the effects of light on pupillary dilation in humans.
Electrodes will be attached to iry assistant in the adjoin-
ing room and I will be in there recording his physiologi-
cal reactions to the light. Your job will be the follow-
ing: Every time the left cue response light goes on,
you a.re to do nothing. Every time the right cue response
lipi'it goes on, you are to press one of these light levers.
You may press any one you wish but, do not hold it down,
merely press it and release it immediately. The higher
the number of the light lever, the brighter the light
which the lever activates. Each lever number represents
ten v/atts of brightness so, lever Nunberl activates a
ten watt light, lever Number 5 activates a fifty watt
light, and lever Number 10 activates a one hundred watt
lipht. I am going into the adjoining room to hook up
the apparatus. In a few rrinutes one of the cue response
lights will go on and the experiment will have begun.
Do you have any questions?”
e xpcri menter
Again, a recording was played and the
recorded the itean lever pull for the 10 "light trials."
Again, there was a total of 20 trials. The subject was
then given the self-concept test and the post-e xperlnental
questionnaire
.
Summary of Predictions
Subjects who have been pressured into assisting the
actress and therefore show an elevation of the self-concept,
are predisposed to engage in anti-social behavior (adniin-
istering shock), which has the aim of lowering the self-
concept back to its chronic level.
Subjects who have refused to assist the actress and
therefore show a lowering of the self-concept level, are
predisposed to engage in pro-social behavior (adminis-
tering reward) which has the aim of raising the self-
concept back to its chronic level.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter is divided into three irain sections.
The first section deals with the lever-pressin p dependent
variable which represents the behavioral effects of the
self-concept manipulations. The second section addresses
Itself to the post-experimental questionnaire. Analyses
of these data yield information about possible cofnitive
effects of the self-concept manipulations. The final
section deals with the self-concept test and provides
information concerning changes in the self-concept level
resulting fro m the various independent variables.
Maj or Dependent Variab le ( lever-pressin g)
An analysis of variance of the 3x3 completely
randomized factorial design was perforned using the
mean of the 10 levers pressed by the subject as the
dependent variable. The group means are presented in
Table 1 and a sumjnary of the analysis of variance is
presented in Table 2.
The overall difference between the HELP, NI, and
HARM gi’oups was significant (F = 61.29, ^ = 2/171,
£<r.001) as was the overall difference created by the
self-concept manipulation (F = 6.77, ^ = 2/171, £'^.005).
The interaction between the perceived effect of
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TABLE 1
Mean Lever Pressed by Subjects
Perceived effect of lever-pressing
Manipulation of
the self-concept
Help Neutral
interaction
(NI)
Harm Mean
Positive
displacement (D+) 6.1k 5.58 5.26 5.86
Control (C) 5.69 5.51 3.50 4.90
Ne gative
displace rr.ent (D-) 7.84 5.88 2.80 5.51
Mean 6.75 5.65 3.85
Note- Possible scores ran ged from a minimum, of 1.00 to a
ma ximu m of 10 . 00
TABLE 2
^15
Analysis of Variance of Lever-Pressinf
Dependent Variable
Source of variation
Ml F
Perceived effect of
lever-pressln f (A) 2 128.60 61.29«*
Manipulation of the
self-concept (B) 2 14.20 6.77*
A X B 20.96 9 , 99 **
Error 171 2.10
*• £<.00t>
** £<.001
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lever-pressing and the rranipulat ion of the self-concept
was also siejiificant (F = 9-99, ^ = 4/171
, ^<.001).
Dunnett's tests were errployed to analyze the main
effects. Scores of the HELP and HARM subjects were com-
pared to those of the NI subjects. As shown in Table 1,
subjects who were told that pressing a lever delivered
electric shock to the experimenter’s assistant (HARM
subjects), pressed significantly lower numbered levers
than subjects who were told that the levers merely acti-
vated a ligiit (d = 6 . 81
, ^ = 3 / 171 , p <.005). Subjects
who were told that pressing the lever delivered a monetary
reward to the experimenter
’ s assistant (HELP subjects),
pressed significantly higher numbered levers than did the
NI subjects (d = 4.16, df = 3 / 171
,
p<:.005). The analysis
of the main effect of the self-concept manipulation
yielded the following results. Subjects who had assisted
the actress prior to their entering the laboratory (D+
subjects), pressed si gnifleant ly higher numbered levers
than did subjects who merely sat outside the laboratory
before entering (C subjects) (d = 3.64, ^ = 3 / 171 ,
£<. 005 ). Similarly, subjects who had refused to assibt
the actress because of the experimenter's interference
(D- subjects), also pressed si gnificantly higher num-
bered levers than did the control subjects (d = 2 . 30
,
« = 3/171, £<.05)
.
was
The source of the significant AxB interaction
as follows: within the HELP gi^oup
,
the D- subjects
pressed significantly higher numbered levers than did
the control subjects (d = 3 . 83
,
df = 3/57, E<.005) while
the lever-pressing of the D+ subjects and the control
subjects did not differ. The reverse held true within
the HARM group where the D+ subjects yielded significantly
higher scores than the control subjects (d = 3 . 62
,
df = 3/57, £<^. 005 ) and the scores of the D- and control
subjects did not differ significantly. Within the HI
group, the lever-pressin g of the D+ and D- gi^oups did
not differ significantly from that of the control group.
Post -Experimental Questionnaire Items
Analyses of variance were performed on subjects’
responses to each of the six questionnaire items. A
summary of these analyses is presented in Table 3-
Ite mi 1^. "Do you tliink that this experinent has
scientific value ?" Group means of subjects’ responses
to this itemi are presented in Table 4. An analysis of
vai’iance on subjects’ responses to this question yielded
a significant main effect of the self-concept manipulation
(F = 3 . 23
, ^ = 2 /171 , £<T-05). The mean response for
D- subjects was 5*70 (out of a possible 9 indicating
naximum scientific value) and the mean response for control
Analyses
of
Variance
of
the
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TABLE
Ratings of the Scientific
Inportance of the Experiment
Perceived effect of lever-pressing
Manipulation of
the self-concept Help Neutral Harm Mean
interaction
(NI)
Positive
di spacemen! (D-J-) 5.25 5.^5 5.05 5.25
Control (C) 5.25 4.70 5.05 5.00
Ne gat ive
displacement (D-) 5.^5 5.80 5.85 5.70
Me an 5.32 5.32 5.32
Note--On all six items, 1.00 = nost negative response and
9.00 - most positive response.
^0
subjects was 5.00. The difference,
. 70
,
was slFniflcant
(d 2.51, ^ - 3 /l 7 ij g<i.Q 25 ). No slfnlfloant differ-
ences existed between responses of the D+ subjects and
control subjects.
ir "Did you ^njoy part iclp at Inp; ^ this exper-
i ment ? Group means of subjects* responses to this ite.m.
are presented in Table 5. The analysis of variance
revealed no significant main effects but did yield a
Significant Interaction between the perceived effect of
lever-pressing and the manipulation of the self-concept
“ 2.98, d_f = V17I, £<C. 025 ). The source of the
significant interaction was as follows: only v;ithin the
HARM group did the D+ subjects enjoy participating in the
experiment significantly more than did the D- subjects
(P = 6.97, ^ = 2/57 , £<C* 01 ). Although the D+ responses
were higher than the control responses while the D-
responses were lower than the control responses
,
neither
the D+ or D- responses differed significantly from the
control subjects* responses.
Item "Do you think you were helpful in providing
the e yperl menter wit h suitable dat a?" Group means of
subjects* responses to this item are presented in Table 6.
The analysis of variance on responses to this itemi yielded
a significant difference due to the self-concept manipu-
lation (F = 6 .^ 2
, ^ = 2/171, p<^.005) but no differences
51
TABLE 5
Ratings of Subjects' Enjoy nent of
Participating in the Experirrent
Perceived effect of lever'
-pressing
Manipulation of
the self-concept
Help Neutral Harm
Interaction
(NI)
Mean
Positive
displacement (D+) 5.10 5.50 5.85 5.il8
Control (C) 5.20 5.^0 ^.80 5.13
Ne gat ive
displacement (D-)
5.60 6.20 (1.35 5.38
Mean 5.30 5.70 5.00
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TABLE 6
Ratings of How Helpful Subjects Were in Providing;
The Experimenter With Suitable Data
Perceived effect of lever-pressing:
Manipulation of
the self-concept Help Neutral Harm Mean
interaction
(NI)
Positive
displace ment (D+) 5.15 5.20 5.55 5.30
Control (C) i|.80 5.10 4.90 4.93
Ne ga.tive
displace rnent (D-) 6.05 6.00 5.30 5.78
Mean 5.33 5.43 5.25
source
due to the effect of lever-pressln f" variable. The
of the significant effect was the fact that the D- sub-
jects responded more positively to this Item than did
the control subjects (d = 3.57, ^ = 3/171, £<.005).
The D+ subjects did not differ to^the control subjects
on their responses to this item.
Item "Do ^ think the experimenter was pleased
with your performance ^ a subject ?" The analysis of
variance on responses to this question yielded no signif-
icant effects.
—
^
^
"2£ think the e xperimenter ’ s assistant
participating in this e xperiment ?" Group means
of subjects’ responses to this item are presented in
Table 7. The analysis of variance revealed that both
the "effect of lever-pressing" variable and the manipu-
lation of the self-concept affected subjects’ responses
to this item (P = 11.^9, ^ = 2/171, £<^.001 and F = 3.33,
~ 2/1/'!, £<[^.05 respectively). The mean response of
HARM subjects was 3-95 and of NI subjects 4.85. The
difference, .PO, was significant (d = 3.17, ^ = 3/171,
£ 005) No difference was found between the HELP and
NI subjects. The effect of the self-concept manipulation
was as follows: subjects v;ho had assisted the actress
( D+ subjects) judged that the experimenter’s assistant
enjoyed participating in the experiment nore than did
TABLE 7
Ratings of How Much the E xperi rrenter ’ s Assistant
Enjoyed Participating in the Experirrent
Perceived effect of lever-pressing
Manipulation of Help Neutral Harm Mean
the self-concept interaction
(NI)
Positive
displacement (D+) 6.00 4.85 4.35 5.6?
Control (C) 4.85 4.80 3.33 4.33
Ne gat ive
displacement (D-) \s\ • o o 4.91 4.15 4.69
Me an 5.28 4.85 3.95
the control subjects (d = 2
. 58
, ^ = 3/ 171 ^ £<. 025 ). No
difference was found between the D- and control subjects.
The interaction was not significant.
Item 6 . "Do ^ think that you were kind ^ the
ej^erimonter^ a^sj^stant?" Group neans of subjects'
responses to this item are presented in Table 8 . Althouph
neither main effect proved sippificant, the analysis of
variance on responses to this item yielded a significant
A X B interaction (F = 2.53, df = Vl71, £<.05). The
source of the interaction was that within the HELP group,
the D+ subjects answered this question more positively
than did the control subjects (d = 2 . 86
,
df = 3 /57
,
£<. 01 ). This was the only statistically significant
comparison
.
Self-Concept Test
The mean self-concept scores (the sum of the "kind,"
"merciful," and reversed "selfish" ratings) for each
group are presented in Table 9 and a summary of the
analysis of variance is presented in Table 10. No sig-
nificant rrain effects were found but the analysis did
yield a significant interaction (F = 4.^7, ^ = Vl71,
£^ 4^(1 . 005 ). Further analyses revealed that the source of
the Interaction v/as that within the NI group, D- subjects
had significantly lower self-concept scores than did the
control subjects (d = 2 . 58
, ^ = 3 /57 , £^^. 02^), while
TABLE 8
Ratings of How Kind tho Subjects Were
to the Experimenter's Assistant
Perceived effect of lever-pressing
Manipulation of Help Neutral Harm Meanthe self-concept interaction
(NI)
Positive
displace ment (D+) 5.90 5.60 5.05 5.52
Control (C) ^.65 ^1.95 5.70 5.10
Ne gative
displace irent (D-) 5.^0 5.10 5.35 5.28
Me an C\lon
•
LT\ 5.22 5.37
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TABLE 9
Group Moans of Self-Concept Scores
Perceived effect of lever-pressing
Manipulation of
the self-concept Help Neutral Harm Mean
interaction
(NI)
Positive
displace irent (D+) 17.30 19.35 18.00 18.22
Control (C) 17. <15 17.80 17.95 17.73
Negative
displace ment (D-) 17. Its 15.85 18.30 17.20
Mean 17.40 17.67 18.08
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TABLE 10
Analysis of Variance
of Self-Concept Data
Source of variation F
Perceived effect of
lever-pressing (A) 2 7.12 1.36
Manipulation of the
self-concept ( 3 ) 2 15.52 2.96
A X B 4 23.43 4.47*
Error
le r^ nnc;
171 5.24
D+ subjects within the NI proup had si rnificant ly hipher
self-concept scores than did the control subjects
(d = 2.05, ^ = 3/57, £^.05). It was also found that
the low self-concept score for the D-/NI proup was sipnif-
icantly lower than the averape self-concept score of the
D-/HFjLP and D-/HARM proups combined (d =^.85, df = 3/171,
£^.005). Sinilarly, the hi £d:i self-concept mean of the
D+/N1 proup was si pnificant ly hipher than the averape
self-concept score of the D+/HELP and D+/HARM proups
combined (d = i|.07, ^ = 3/171, £<.005). In other words,
the effect of the self-concept manipulation was manifested
on the self-concept test only when the subject enpaged in
subsequent neutral interaction in which no rev^’ard or
shock was involved.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Hypothesis I
The flndinps of this study lend a considerable
amount of support to the hypothesis, which stated that
pro-social action which results in an increase in one’s
opinion of his own benevolence, instigates an individual
to anti—social action which has the aim of restoring
the self-concept to its chronic level.
In terms of the lever-pressing variable errployed
in the present research design, the specific prediction
generated by Hypothesis 1 was that subjects v;ho engaged
in pro-social action (D+ subjects) would administer a
higher level of shock than would the control subjects
who did not engage in pro-social action. The finding
that, in the HARM condition, the D+ subjects pressed
si gnificant ly higher numbered levers than did the C
subjects represents strong support for Hypothesis 1.
In terms of the self-concept data, the prediction
was that the self-concepts of the D+ subjects who had
been given an opportunity to administer shock (D+/HARM
subjects ) to the experimenter’s assistant would not
differ form the self-concepts of control subjects who
received no self-concept manipulation. The finding that
6l
the self-concept scores of the D+/HARM subjects and the
C/HARM subjects did not differ while the self-concept
riean of the D+/NI group was significantly higher than
the self-concept irean of the D+/HARM group leads to the
conclusion that the high magnitude anti-social behavior
exhibited in the laboratory by the D+/HARM subjects
served to restore the experimentally raised self-concepts
to a chronic level.
One ml gilt predict fro m the homeostatic model that
pro-social action which raises an individual's self-
concept level would inhibit him from engaging in further
pro-social action which might have the effect of raising
the self-concept level even further. In terms of the
present research design, D+ subjects would have been
expected to administer a lower level of reward than would
the control (C) subjects, who were not exposed to any
self-concept manipulation. This expectation was not
confirmed
.
The possibility" that a lack of effectiveness of the
D+ self-concept manipulation could account for the absence
of this expected effect is discounted by the analyses of
the self-concept data from both the pretest and the
actual e xperi rent . Further, the finding that the self-
concept scores for the D+/HELP subjects were significantly
lower than the self-concept scores for the D+/NI subjects
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indicates that the D+/HELP subjects did succeed in
restoring the experimentally raised self-concept to a
chronic level.
Since the lever-pressing data indicated that the
D+/HELP subjects did not employ behavioral means to
restore equilibrium: to the self-concept, perhaps some
cognitive neans was utilized. If the D+/HELP subjects
evaluated their reward-administering behavior differ-
ently than did the the C/HELP subjects, such differences
might be revealed by analyses of the post-experimental
questionnaire items. Specifically, the D+/HELP subjects
should have evaluated their reward-administering behavior
as being less helpful to the experimenter and/or the
experinenter ' s assistant than should have the C/HELP
subjects. Analyses of the questionnaire data revealed
no si fnifleant differences between the D+/HELP and
the C/HELP groups on any of the six questions.
Another possible explanation for the restoration of
the D+/HELP self-concepts in the absence of supporting
lever-pressing data is that these subjects acconplished
the restoration process via some eo^iitve means which
was not tapped in the present study. For exaiple, it is
possible that the reward-administering instruct ions which
followed the pro-social manipulation were perceived as a
threat to further elevate the self-concepts of the D+/HELP
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subjects. In order to prevent any further displace rent
,
the D+/HELP subjects rd fht have re-evaluated the benevol-
ence aspect of aiding the actress so that the aiding
behavior was evaluated as neutral, e
.
g. only did what
anyone else would have done.” if these subjects then
evaluated their giving reward to the e xperi rrenter ' s
assistant as either a neutral or slightly pro-social
action, equilibrium of the self-concept could have been
maintained and the D+/HELP self-concept scores v;ould not
m those of the C/NI subjects. The possibility
that the rev/ard—ad ninistering behavior was not perceived
as highly pro-social is supported by the lack of any
difierences between the HELP and NI groups on the ques-
tionnaire item, concerning the experimenter's assistant's
enjoy irent of the experiment (item: 5) or on the item con-
cerning the subjects’ being kind to the experimenter's
assista.nt (item 6). Admittedly, such an interpretation
is highly speculative and the present study did not erploy
the dependent variables needed to test such an interpre-
tation .
Although the data obtained from the subjects in the
D+/HELP group are difficult to interpret, the critical
test of Hypothesis 1 involved the comparison of the levers
pressed by the D+/HAR^^ subjects and the C/HARM subjects
and the self-concept scores of the D+/HARM subjects and
sup;(Ter,ted that
the D+/NI subjects. These comparisons
a positive displaoenent of one's position alonp the bene-
volence dinension of the self-concept does. In fact,
instigate an individual to anti-social action (when such
a response is nade salient) which restores the self-concept
to its chronic level.
Hypothesis 2
Considerable support was also found for the hypo-
thesis which asserted that a decrease in one's opinion
of his ov;n benevolence resulting from anti-social action
instip;ates an individual to pro-social action which
restores the self-concept to its chronic level.
In terms of the lever-pressing variable, the specific
prediction generated by Hypothesis 2 was that subjects
who engaged in anti-social action (D- subjects) would
admi.nister a higher level of reward to the experimenter’s
assistant than would the control subjects who did not
engage in anti-social action. The finding that, in the
HELP condition, the D- subjects pressed significantly
higher numbered levers than did the C subjects confirms
the above prediction.
In terns of the self-concept data, the prediction
was that the self-concepts of the D- subjects who had
been given an opportunity to administer reward (D-/HELP
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subjects) would not differ from the self-concepts of
control subjects who were not exposed to any self-concept
manipulation. The finding that the self-concept scores
of the D-/HELP subjects did not differ fron those of the
C/HELP subjects while the self-concept mean of the D-/N 1
group was sl0,ificantly lower than the self-concept mean
of the D-/HELP group leads to the conclusion that the
high magnitude pro-social behavior exhibited in the
laboratory by the D-/HELP subjects served to restore the
experimentally lowered self-concepts back to a chronic
level
.
According to the present analysis, pro-social
behavior nay consist merely of refuslno- to commit an act
which rra o-ht injure another human being. As such, the
HARM subjects v;ere all given an opportunity to engage
in pro-social behavior. By choosing to press only the
lower nur,)bered levers, the HARM subjects could have
refrained from causing harm^ to the experimenter’s assist-
ant. According to the homeostatic model then, the D-
subjects should have administered a lower level of shock
than the control subjects. This expectation was not
supported
.
Again, analyses of the self-concept data indicated
that the negative displace rrent self-concept manipulation
was effective so that the lack of a difference in
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Shock- flvlng between the D-/HARM and c/HARM ^n-oups
cannot be attributed to a failure to displace the seif-
concept
.
one possible explanation for the absence of a slEnlf
leant difference in lever-nre^si n o-r p ssi g between the D-/HARM
and C/HARM ^oups involves a rethodolo.lcal consideration
It is possible that the mean shook level of the C/IIARM
fToup was so low (3.50 out of a possible 10) that there
was an insufficient number of levers below this mean to
allow foi a si pnlflcantly lower score, especially If
subjects perceived their task as one which required their
pressinfT various levers. Such a percept mlftit have
prevented a subject frompressing ten ”ls,” or five "Is"
and five "2s," etc.
The self-concept analyses also indicated that the
D-/HARM subjects successfully restored the initially
lowered self-concept to a chronic level. Since the
lever-pressing data indicated that the restoration was
not accomplished via behavioral means, the possibility
again exists that some cognitive means was errployed.
Analyses of the post-e jq^eri mental questionnaire data
revealed no significant differences between the D-/HARM
and the C/HARM groups on any of the six items. Again,
it would appear that restoration of the self-concept
was ac CO mp lished via s ome co gni t i ve means which was not
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tapped in the present study.
The finding that both the D+/HELP subjects and the
D-/HARM subjects successfully restored equilibrium to
the self-concept while falling to yield supporting behav-
ioral (lever-pressing) data tends to support the homeo-
static niodel. Although the means by which the self-concepts
were shifted back to the maximum outcome level remains
undetected, the fact remains that the experimentally
induced displacements were only temporary. The finding
that the self-concepts of the D+/N1 subjects and D-/NI
subjects did not return to a chronic level supf^sts
that there was sone aspect of the reward- giving and
shock— giving situations which mediated the restoration
in the D+/HELP and D-/HARM groups. It is possible that,
once the self-concept level is displaced, if the individual
is then faced with a situation v;hich threatens to shift
the self-concept level even further, he re-evaluates the
behavior which resulted in the initial displacement.
Unfortunately, the present study did not employ the
dependent variables needed to determine the nature of the
cognitive process by which the D-f/HELP and D-/HARM
subjects accomplished restoration.
Although the data obtained from the D-/HARM group
is subject to several interpretations, the fact renains
that the D- subjects who were given an opportunity to
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reward the expert nenter' s assistant administered a
slpilflcantly greater mapriitude of reward than did control
subjects who were given the sane opportunity. This
finding, coupled with the fact that the reward-giving
behavior raised the negatively displaced self-concepts
of the D-/HELP subjects back to a chronic level, represents
Strong support for Hypothesis 2.
Additional Findings
Thus far, only those results which had a direct
bearing on the hypotheses have been discussed. The data
analyses revealed several other significant effects
which are tangential to the hypotheses, but nonetheless,
are of psychological interest.
Analyses of the lever-pressing data revealed that
the subjects who were told that they were delivering
shock to the experimenter's assistant pressed signifi-
cantly lower nunbered levers than did the NI subjects
who believed that they were merely activating a light.
It VIQ.S also found that the subjects who were led to
believe that they were delivering reward to the experi-
menter's assistant pressed significantly higher numbered
levers than did the NI subjects. Such a finding is not
surprising and merely indicates that the subjects were
miore prone to adhere to, rather than deviate from, the
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benevolence norm repardless of any self-concept iranlpu-
lation
.
The finding that the D+ subjects and the D- subjects
pressed significantly higher nurrbered levers than did
the control subjects who received no self-concept nanipu-
lation was not expected. This finding- indicates that
the self-concept manipulation (regardless of direction)
led to an increase in the magnitude of the stimulus
(shock, light, and noney) which the subjects administered
in the laboratory. One possible explanation for this
finding is suggested by the "frustration-aggression
hypothesis (Dollard, Doob
,
Miller, Mowrer, and Sears,
1939) or the "frustration-drive hypothesis" (Brown, I961).
These hypotheses assert that one result of frustration
is hign magnitude responding. Since, in the present
study, forced-conpliance behavior was used to displace
the self-concept from, its chronic level, this displacement
may have constituted a frustrating event. If the D+ and
D- subjects entered the laboratory iminediately after
having e^qjerienced frustration, then the high magnitude
lever-pressing which these subjects exhibited would be
anticipated
.
Analyses of the questionnaire data also yielded
several interesting findings. It was found that the
subjects who refused to assist the actress (D- subjects)
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rated the scientific irrportance of the experinent signif-
icantly higher than did the control subjects. Viewed in
terms of cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957)
this finding is easily interpretable. One of the postu-
lates of cognitive dissonance theory is that, once an
individual has made a choice from two or irore alternatives,
he tends to enhance the chosen alternative. This enhance-
ment may be viewed as an attenpt by the individual to
convince himself that he has, in fact, made the correct
choice. In the present study, participation in the
ejqDerinent provided the D- subjects with a rationale for
refusing to assist the actress. The more scientifically
iirportant the experiment, the more Justified the subjects
were in choosing to fulfill their role as subject rather
than helping the actress and possibly arriving late for
the start of the experinent. By upgrading the scientific
inpcrtance of the experiment, the D- subjects were
enhancing their chosen alternative.
Given the above finding, one night also expect that,
in an effort to reduce any dissonance created by the
refusal to assist the actress, the D- subjects would have
enjoyed participating in the experiment more than did
the control subjects. As indicated in Table 5, the D-
mean was higher than the control mean, but the difference was
not statistically significant. There was however, a
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significant interaction. Within the HARM proup, the D+
subjects enjoyed participating in the experinent signif-
icantly rore than did the D- subjects. It is tenptinp
to interpret this finding- as indicating that subjects
who were given a behavioral opportunity to restore the
shifted self-concept back to the chronic level enjoyed
the experiment more than did the D-/HARM subjects who
were not given this opportunity. If this interpretation
were valid, one would expect that within the HELP group,
the D- subjects would have enjoyed participating in the
experiment more than the D4* subjects did since the
D-/HELP subjects were also given a behavioral opportunity
to restore to equilibrium the experimentally shifted
self-concept. Althougli the group means were in the
anticipated direction, the difference was not statistically
si pnificant
.
How can one explain the difference in "enjoyment"
between the D-f/HARM and the D-/HARM subjects and the lack
of such a difference between the D-/HELP and the D-f/HELP
subjects? A perusal of Table 5 ("Did you enjoy partici-
pating in this experiment?) reveals the source of this
finding. Ad ninisterin g shock depressed scores on this
question in the D-/HARM group and the C/HARM group but not
in the D+/HARM group. The scores of the D+/HARM subjects
did not differ from the scores of the D+/NI subjects.
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Ihls indicates that the D+/HARM frroup did not enjoy
participating in the experiment any irore than did the
neutral interaction subjects. The source of the sipnifi-
cant effect was the fact that negative affect was created
in the C/HARM and .D-/HARM groups but not in the D+/HARM
group. The D+/HARM subjects engaged in pro-social action
(aiding the actress) and anti-social action (administer-
ing shock to the e xperi renter ' s assistant) and hence,
their total experience was neither pleasant nor unpleasant.
The C/HARM and D-/HARM subjects only engaged in anti-
social action and hence, they enjoyed the experiment less
than did the D+/HARM subjects.
It was found that the D- subjects rated themselves
as si g'Vii fleant ly rore helpful to the experi renter than
did the control subjects. Such a percept may indicate
that the D- subjects were er^ioying a cogriitive reans in
their atterpt to raise their self-concepts back to the
maxi rum outcome level. It should be noted however, that
this finding that the D- subjects rated themselves as
si fnifleant ly rore helpful to the e x{'>eri renter than did
the control subjects is also subject to a dissonance
interpretation. By seeing ther:selves as bein g e xtre rely
helpful to the e xperlrenter , the D- subjects migiit have
been trying to Justify their earlier refusal to assist
the actress.
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The finding that subjects who adndnistered shock
to the experi neuter’s assistant rated the e xperl nenter
'
s
assistant's enjoyment in taking part in the experiment
(item 5) significantly lower than did the NI subjects
leads to an obvious conclusion. Subjects believed that
it is more pleasant to have one's pupils dilated by
li £iit than to have one's heart decelerated by electric
shock. Althougii the nean response of the HELP subjects
to this question was higher than the mean response of
the NI subjects, the difference was not statistically
sigriificant
.
Analyses of the questionnaire data revealed that
the D+ subjects responded to item. 5 ("Do you think the
experimenter's assistant enjoyed paricipating in this
experiment?") significantly nxDre positively than did the
control subjects. It was also found that within the
HELP group, the D+ subjects rated thenselves as being
si fnificant ly nore kind to the experimenter's assistant
(itemi 6) than did the control subjects. These two find-
ings suggest that sone generalization effect m.ay have
been operative, i.e. these subjects helped the actress
prior to their entering the laboratory and therefore
perceived themselves as helping (providing enjoynent
for and being kind to) the experimenter's assistant.
If, in fact, such a generalization effect was operative,
7 ^
then one would expect that the D+ subjects would also
show hiph scores on the questions concerning helping
the experinienter (items 3 and 4) and would also exhibit
hiph self-concept scores (since the generalization
phenomenon would tend to maintain the experimentally
raised self-concept level). Analyses of the post-exper-
imental questionnaire data and the self-concept data
failed to reveal these anticipated effects.
I irplications of the Homeostatic Model
Glass (1964) asserts that an upward shift of the
^ con cep t level results in behavior which is consist-
ent with the new self-concept level while the homeostatic
model asserts that an upward shift of the self-concept
level results in behavior which tends to restore the
self-concept to a chronic level. V/hile these two
approaches appear to generate oppoang predictions
,
the two approaches are conpatible if one takes into
account temporal factors involved in the restoration
process. According to the homeostatic nodel, an upward
displacenent in the self-concept level is not
permanent because the rewards associated with the raised
self-concept level are outweighted by the costs of main-
taining the new self-concept level. The rewards (an
increase in feelings of self-v;orth and self-respect)
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are experienced immediately while the costs of nain-
taininp: the elevated self-concept level need not be
Incurred i mnediately
. Only at such a tirre as the costs
must be Incurred (e.fr. the individual is faced with an
opportunity to engage in additional benevolent activity)
or, the means to restore the self-concept to its normal
level are made salient (thereby making the costs of
restoration minimal) will the individual behave in such
a manner as to lower the elevated self-concept to its
chronic level. In other words, there is no reason to
predict that a positive displacement of the self-concept
level v/ill instigate an individual to create a situation
which will permit hlmi to engage in anti-social action.
The individual has learned that opportunites to violate
the benevolence norm are frequently encountered and
hence, he is able to experience temporarily the rev;ards
associated with the elevated self-concept level until
the opportunity arises to restore the self-concept to
its chronic level.
This resistance to restoration which typifies an
elevated self-concept is not encountered when one is
dealing with a downward shift in the self-concept level.
The costs incurred when the self-concept is lowered
(a decrease in feelings of self-worth and self-respect)
are e^erienced 1 minediately . The rewards, e.g. a decrease
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in the olipatlon to enpafe in benevolent activity,
are not only outweighed by the added costs but also
are not experienced until such time as the individual
is confronted with the choice of whether to enpape in
some mode of benevolent activity. The costs which are
immediately Incurred instipate the individual to seek
out a situation in which he may enpape in pro-social
activity which restores the self-concept to the chronic
level and the individual is alleviated of the added
costs he is currently incurrlnp.
In a recent study by Aronson and Mettee (1968),
the authors interpreted their results as indicating
that lowering the self-concept level results in behavior
which is consistent with the new self-concept level.
Such a position is obviously inconpatible with the
arpument presented above. In the Aronson and Mettee
study, subjects were given false feedback from psycho-
logical tests which (it was presumed) resulted in a
lowering of the self-concept level. When these subjects
were then given an opportunity to cheat and win money
in a gave of "Blackjack," it was found that they took
advantage of this opportunity mere often than did sub-
jects who had not been given false, negative feedback.
The authors interpreted this finding as indicating that
the immoral cheating behavior was more consistent with
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the experimentally lowered self-concept level than with
a normal self-concept level.
It is possible however, to Interpret the Aronson
and Mettee finding as supporting the present homeostatic
model. If one Interprets cheating behavior in their
experimental setting as an attempt to achieve, excel,
or do well relative to the performance of other subjects,
then the cheating behavior may have represented an
atterrpt to raise the experimentally lowered self-concept
back to a chronic level.
The present finding that anti-social action m.ay
lead to pro-social action confirms a relationship which
already had been established by other studies (e.g.
Darlington and Macker, I966; Berscheid and V/alster,
1967). Depending upon the particular orientation of
the theorist or researcher, the labels which have been
applied to the uncomifortable cognitive state which
typically follows anti-social behavior include guilt,
dissonance, regret, etc. Up to nov;, a behavioral rela-
tionship based upon the alleviation of an uncomifort able
cognitive state had been established. The present
research goes one step further. The results of the
present study indicate that the probable source of the
uncomTortalble state is a decrease in one’s position
along the benevolence dirrension of the self-concept.
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The subsequent pro-soolal action raises the self-concept
back to the chronic level and the unco rfortable copjiltlve
state is alleviated.
1 Ihe results of the present study sup;gest that any
given pro-social or anti-social act may be accounted
for in terms of any one of three processes. First, it
nay i*epresent an atteirpt to restore a negatively or
positively shifted self-concept back to its chronic
level. Second, it may represent forced-compliance
behavior which results in a positive or negative shift
along the benevolence dimension of the self-concept.
Third, it nay represent nornal activity for that indi-
vidual’s chronic self-concept level. In order to deter-
mine which of these processes is responsible for the
pro-social or anti-social action, lU would be necessary
to analyze the individual's behavior which preceded the
act, and the effect which the preceding behavior had
on the individual's self-concept. The observed behavior
m.ay or nay not affect subsequent behavior depending
upon which of the three processes is responsible for
the pro-social or anti-social action.
Suggestions for Further Research
Although the present findings do not suggest any
specific llnitations of the homeostatic model, the
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nature of the experirrcntal settinp must be taken into
account when one attenpts to generalize from these
findings. It must be remembered that the negative
displacement manipulation employed in the present study
was the product of a request by a legitimate authority
(the experimenter). Similarly, the anti-social action
which took place within the laboratory was also at the
request of legitimate authority and was directed toward
an experimenter’s assistant who probably had full knowl-
edge of the consequences of his job and was probably
paid for his efforts. These experimental conditions
suggest two questions. What is the precise nature of
behaviors which will cause a displacement along the
self"-concept level, and, what factors determine who
will be the target of behavioral restoration?
The findings also suggested that, under certain
conditions, the restoration process will take a behav-
ioral form, under other conditions, cognitive processes
will be utilized, or finally, the self-concept level
will remain shifted (as in the D+/NI and the D-/NI
conditions). Although the present findings suggested
that situational factors play an important role in deter-
mining the restoration rrode, these factors have yet to
be specified. Perhaps personality variables by them-
selves or interacting with situational variables also
80
have an effect on the means by which restoration will
take place.
In the present study, the D-/HARM subjects and the
D+/HLLP subjects acco nplished restoration without yield-
ing any supporting behavioral or copjiitive data. It is
suppested, that in future studies, additional cof^nitive
data be obtained. Specifically, data concerning; the
subj ects
'
perceptions of the displacement manipulations
should be obtained both before and after the subjects
have been g-iven an opportunity for behavioral restora-
tion .
Once these questions are ansv-zered and the linita-
tions of the homeostatic model are known, questions of
a nore general nature may be asked. If the honeostatic
model is indeed valid, can certain child rearing prac-
tices be modified as to lessen nan’s propensity to
engage in anti-social action? Can the homeostatic
model together with a construct such as "collective
self-concept" account for such nass phenomena as riots,
lynchings, or even, war?
The major contribution of the present research
is that it provides a new approach to the study of
pro-social and anti-social action. However, until
additional research is conducted, and the limitations
of the homeostatic model are realized, it is difficult
o assess its full iirpllcati
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APPENDIX
Self-Concept Test
86
The purpose of this test is to find out how you per-
ceive yourself in relation to a number of personality
dimensions. Your task will be to rate yourself on 25
personality dimensions. Each personality dimension is
represented by a scale which is divided into 9 equal
spaces. You are to put a check-mark in one of these 9
spaces. Your placement of the checkmark depends on how
similar you feel you are to other university students
along the different dimensions. As an exairple, let's
take the dimension "Happy."
"Happy"
Above Below
Avera^ :::::::::: Average12 3^5^?F"9
Avera ge
Notice that the fifth space is marked "Average." This
space represents how happy the average university student
feels he is. If you felt that you were about as happy as
the average university student, you would check this space.
If you felt that you v/ere sli pht ly more happy than the
average university student, you would check space ^4. If
you felt that you were somewhat more happy than the aver-
age university student, you would check space ^3* If you
felt that you were considerably more happy than the average
university student, you would check space H2, If you felt
that you were extremely more happy than the average
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university student, you would check space #1. a space
to the right of the "Average" space would be checked if
you felt that you were less happy than the average uni-
versity student. If you felt that you were slightly
less happy than the average university student, you would
check space #G. If you felt that you were somewhat less
happy that the average university student, you would check
space #7. if you felt that were considerably less happy
than the average university student, you would check
space ^8. If you felt that you were e xtremely less happy
than the average university student, you would check
space ^9.
Remember, you are conparing yourself to the average
university student. So, if you felt that you were an
extremely happy person but also that the average univer-
sity student were an extremely happy person, you v/ould
check space number 5 since you are no more or less happy
than the average university student.
Take your time. Try to perform this task as accur-
ately as possible. Place your check-marks in the middle
of the spaces chosen and not on the lines • that separate
the spaces.
Above
Average
"Adaptable"
1
-
- j
--
• • • «
~<r ~r ~T
Average
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Below
Average
Above
Avera ge
"Bold"
"TT — “T"
Average
T“ T" T
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Assertive
"
2 ~1> n 5
^‘“
7
“*“^’“^“'
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Inquisitive"
Average
Be lov;
Average
Above
Average
"Intelligent"
12 3 ~T~ 5 7 “8“ 9
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Kind"
Below::::::::: Average12 3 ~T' 5 “8“ 7 9
Average
Above
Average
"Modern"
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Tense"
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Opti mist ic"
Average
Below
Average
"Active”
Above
Average
Above
Average
Above
Average
Above
Average
1 2 3 "TT
—
-5- —
-g-'-g-
Average
"Creative"
•
* * *
Average
1 2 8 9
"Neat"
2 3 ~r 5~5 7 8 9
Average
"Liberal"
1 2 T ~TT — —
Average
B“ T
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Below
Avera ge
Below
Average
Below
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Merciful"
T~ ~T ~
-f
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Efficient"
123 5 “8“ 7 9
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
Above
Average
"Trust In g"
Average
Belov:
Average
"Practical"
*1*2*3
5
“8“
7 9
Average
Below
Average
"Discreet"
Above Below
Average :::::::::: Average~
~2~ ~
~r 9
Average
Above
Average
"Careful" 90
Above
Average
~
"~2
Average
"Selfish"
Average
T" "F" T
Below
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
" Lucky"
1
* * • • •
2 3 ^
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Ori ginal"
T" ~T-
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Secure"
• • • • * , , ,
“I 2 3 ^ 5
Average
Below
Average
Above
Average
"Boring"
Below
Average12 3 "T" 5 “F“ 7 9
Average
Above
Average
"Attractive"
Average
Below
Average
Post-ETOerlnental Questionnaire
Please answer the following; questions care fully 92
1. Do you think this expcrinent
I Think This
Ejqjerinent Has
Much Scientific
Value
has scientific value?
I Don't Think This
Experinent Has
Any Scientific
Value
2, Did you enjoy participating in this experiment?
I Enjoyed It I Did Not Enjoy
Very Much It At All
3. Do you think you were helpful in providinp the ejqjer-
imenter with suitable data?
I Think I Was
Extremely
Helpful
I Don't Think
I Was At All
Helpful
. Do you think the experimenter was pleased with your
performance as a subject?
I Think The
Experimenter Was
Very Pleased
I Don't Think The
Experimenter Was
At All Pleased
5. Do you think that the experimenter's assistant enjoyed
participatinp in this experiment?
I Think He
Enjoyed It
Very Much
I Don't Think
He Enjoyed It
At All
6. Do you think that you were kind to the e xperi renter'
s
assistant?
I Think
I Was
Very Kind
I Don't Think
I Was At All
Kind

